A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold
This article demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence does not necessarily hold in models with altruistic transfers once one takes into account the strategic behavior of recipients as well as donors. To influence the final allocation of consumption in altruistic settings, potential recipients can threaten to refuse transfers. The authors apply the extended Nash bargaining solution to the problem of an altruistic parent and a possible altruistic child. They show that when the government redistributes between the parent and child, it changes their endowments and the equilibrium threats and, thus, the final allocation of consumption. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 100 (1990)
Issue (Month): 403 (December)
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