The Gains from Fiscal Cooperation in the Two Commodity Real Trade Model
This paper analyzes the gains from fiscal cooperation within the context of the standard two commodity real trade model. It shows how the adjustment in terms of trade is the critical factor in determining the effects of moving from a noncooperative equilibrium. In general, a noncooperative equilibrium leads to an overexpansion of government expenditure on the export good and an underexpansion on the import good, relative to a cooperative equilibrium. The specific example of a logarithmic economy is also considered. The paper discusses further the welfare effects resulting from the formation of a coalition among two countries.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1987|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Turnovsky, Stephen J. "The Gains from Fiscal Cooperation in the Two Commodity Real Trade Model," Journal of International Economics, Vol. 25, 1988.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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