Net Neutrality, Pricing Instruments and Incentives
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References listed on IDEAS
- Shane Greenstein & Martin Peitz & Tommaso Valletti, 2016.
"Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the Trade-Offs,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 127-150, Spring.
- Shane Greenstein & Martin Peitz & Tommaso Valletti, 2016. "Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the Trade-offs," NBER Working Papers 21950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Greenstein, Shane & Peitz, Martin & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2016. "Net neutrality: a fast lane to understanding the trade-offs," Working Papers 16-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-03-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-03-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2016-03-29 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2016-03-29 (Network Economics)
- NEP-REG-2016-03-29 (Regulation)
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