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Privatization of solid waste collection

Author

Listed:
  • Hiroshi Kinokuni

    (Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, 1-1-1 Nojihigashi, Kusatsu, Shiga 525-8577, Japan)

  • Shuichi Ohoriy

    (Faculty of Informatics, Kansai University, 2-1-1 Ryozenjicho, Takatsuki, Osaka 569-1052, Japan)

  • Yasunobu Tomoda

    (Faculty of Economics, Hiroshima University, 1-2-1 Kagamiyama, Higashihiroshima, Hiroshima, 739-8525, Japan)

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the optimal degree of the privatization of solid waste collection service. We show that the privatization of the col- lector decreases the investment to the selection capacity for the separated collection, the household's effort to separate the waste and the amount of the separated collection, while it increases the unseparated waste. Also, partial privatization is the optimum. The optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the disposal fee and the marginal environmental damage cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroshi Kinokuni & Shuichi Ohoriy & Yasunobu Tomoda, 2018. "Privatization of solid waste collection," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 1803, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
    • Handle: RePEc:nan:wpaper:1803
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Solid waste management; Privatization;

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes

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