Partial privatization and environmental policies
The paper compares emission tax and emission quota in a mixed duopoly when the partial privatization of a public firm is allowed. Furthermore, we consider the following two cases with regard to the objective of the public firm: (1) the public firm maximizes the weighted average of its profit and wefare and (2) the public firm maximizes the weighted average of its profit and the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. We show that emission tax is welfare superior to emission quota regardless of the degree of partial privatization in (1), whereas the former is inferior to the latter when the degree of partial privatization is high in (2).
|Date of creation:||21 Dec 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shuichi Ohori, 2006. "Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 225-233, 03.
- Kazuhiko Kato, 2006. "Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 88(3), pages 263-283, 09.
- Leonard F. S. Wang & Ya-chin Wang & Lihong Zhao, 2009. "Privatization and the Environment in a Mixed Duopoly with Pollution Abatement," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 3112-3119.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27630. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.