Brevet, secret et concurrence technologique : comment protéger les instruments de recherche ?
This article uses a two-step technological race model to evaluate the optimal protection of new research instruments, i.e., inventions that are not directly associated to commercial profits but that facilitate further technological progress. We show that paradoxically, granting the patentee an exclusive ownership right over all the research line and related applications (prospect doctrine) is optimal only when the R&D costs are relatively low and when the courts can implement mixed strategies regarding the settlement of patent trials (thus implying that identical legal cases lead to differing outcomes). In other settings, the court should rather force the infringer to pay a license fee proportionate to the R&D savings generated by the disclosure of the research instrument (enablement doctrine).
|Date of creation:||Jun 2004|
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- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002.
"Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?,"
in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 51-78
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gallini, Nancy & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9wx2c2hz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000532, David K. Levine.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Law and Economics 0201001, EconWPA.
- Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Economics Working Papers E01-303, University of California at Berkeley.
- Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2000. "Damages and injunctions in protecting proprietary research tools," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 177, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2001. "Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools," Law and Economics 0012002, EconWPA.
- Schankerman, Mark & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2000. "Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3c04n348, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Mark Schankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2000. "Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools," Economics Working Papers E00-288, University of California at Berkeley.
- Schankerman, Mark & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2000. "Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools," CEPR Discussion Papers 2554, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Merges, Robert P. & Nelson, Richard R., 1994. "On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, September.
- Kitch, Edmund W, 1977. "The Nature and Function of the Patent System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 265-290, October.
- Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, 1999. "Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 133-160, 03. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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