Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R & D, and Welfare
In this paper we examine the consequences of this difference for (i) firm's R&D and patenting behavior, (ii) consumers' surplus and social welfare, and (iii) the incentives of firms to innovate, in a setting where patent protection is imperfect in the sense that patent applications may be rejected and patents are not always upheld in court. We show that public disclosure of patent applications leads to fewer applications and fewer innovations, but for a given number of innovations, it raises the probability that new technologies will reach the product market and thereby enhances consumers' surplus and possibly total welfare as well.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- O'DONOGHUE, Ted & SCOTCHMER, Suzanne & THISSE, Jacques-FranÃ§ois, .
"Patent breadth, patent life, and the pace of technological progress,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1314, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ted O'Donoghue & Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, 1998. "Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, 03.
- Mansfield, Edwin & Schwartz, Mark & Wagner, Samuel, 1981. "Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(364), pages 907-18, December.
- Arundel, Anthony & Kabla, Isabelle, 1998. "What percentage of innovations are patented? empirical estimates for European firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 127-141, June.
- Mukesh Eswaran & Nancy Gallini, 1996. "Patent Policy and the Direction of Technological Change," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 722-746, Winter.
- Hylton, Keith N, 1993. "Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 187-210, January.
- Waterson, Michael, 1990. "The Economics of Product Patents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 860-69, September.
- Aoki, Reiko & Prusa, Thomas J., 1996.
"Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems,"
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,
Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 233-249, September.
- Thomas J. Prusa & Reiko Aoki, 1996. "Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems," Departmental Working Papers 199423, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Reiko Aoki & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under U.S.and Japanese Patent Systems," NBER Working Papers 5063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Choi, Jay Pil, 1998.
"Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1249-63, December.
- Choi, J.P., 1997. "Patent Litigation as an Information Transmission Mechanism," Discussion Paper 1997-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Claude CRAMPES & Corinne LANGINIER, 1998.
"Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,
ENSAE, issue 49-50, pages 265-288.
- Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2000. "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Staff General Research Papers 10461, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Crampes, C. & Langinier, C., 1996. "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Papers 96.429, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Gilbert, R. & Shapiro, C., 1988.
"Optimal Patent Length And Breadth,"
28, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October.
- Merges, Robert P. & Nelson, Richard R., 1994. "On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, September.
- Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990. "Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring.
- Janusz A. Ordover, 1991. "A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
- Howard F. Chang, 1995. "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 34-57, Spring.
- Klemperer, Paul, 1990.
"How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
- Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 1996. "Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 60-83, Spring.
- Edwin Mansfield, 1986. "Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 173-181, February.
- Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1988. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 862, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1987. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(3), pages 783-832.
- Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, 1999. "Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 133-160, 03.
- Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1273. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.