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Political support to public debt repudiation in a Monetary Union - the role of the geographical allocation of debt

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  • Di Gioacchino, Debora
  • Ginebri, Sergio

    ()

  • Sabani, Laura

Abstract

The main arguments for the Stability and Growth Pact turn on the need to protect the European Central Bank against inflationary pressures from the fiscally prodigal countries (repudiation through inflation). Taking a political economy approach, in this paper we inquire into the conditions under which national governments may reach the decision for a partial or total repudiation of their debt. The main result produced by our model is that a debt management policy of lowering effective yields might be the dominant option for a self-interested government whose creditors consist in part of non-residents. On the basis of such result we argue that the impact of the fiscal position of the various member countries on the stability of EMU does not depend on the stock of debt but on the proportion of it that is held abroad.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Gioacchino, Debora & Ginebri, Sergio & Sabani, Laura, 2004. "Political support to public debt repudiation in a Monetary Union - the role of the geographical allocation of debt," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04019, University of Molise, Dept. EGSeI.
  • Handle: RePEc:mol:ecsdps:esdp04019
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    File URL: http://web.unimol.it/progetti/repec/mol/ecsdps/ESDP04019.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1999. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 299-325, December.
    2. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-269, March.
    3. Di Gioacchino, Debora & Ginebri, Sergio & Sabani, Laura, 2000. "Bribery and Public Debt Repudiation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 303-321, December.
    4. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Democracy," UCLA Economics Working Papers 435, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    6. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
    7. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Waldenström, Daniel, 2005. "Does Sovereign Risk Differ for Domestic and Foreign Investors? Historical Evidence from Scandinavian Bond Markets," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 585, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2005.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary union; Public debt; Government default; Political economy; Political support; Special interests; Common agency.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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