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Max-Max Group Contests with Incomplete Information à la Global Games

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Listed:
  • Davide Bosco
  • Mario Gilli
  • Andrea Sorrentino

Abstract

In this paper we introduce incomplete information `a la global games into a deterministic two-group contest with the best-shot impact function and binary actions and we characterize the set of equilibria. Depending on whether the complete information assumption is relaxed on the value of the prize or on the cost of providing effort, we obtain different results in terms of equilibrium uniqueness: in the first case, there exist an equilibrium in (monotonic) switching strategies which could be not unique, whereas in the second one there exists a unique equilibrium in (monotonic) switching-strategies. Then, we discuss the presence of the group-size paradox for both classes of games.The results are thus extended to the case of M groups, and the properties of Bayes-Nash equilibria for these classes of games are investigated. Finally, we show a limit-uniqueness and a noise independent selection result.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Bosco & Mario Gilli & Andrea Sorrentino, 2025. "Max-Max Group Contests with Incomplete Information à la Global Games," Working Papers 548, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:548
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1991. "Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games," Other publications TiSEM bd92d0ae-790f-40ad-afea-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 94-103.
    3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 105-125, July.
    4. repec:wly:soecon:v:83:1:y:2016:p:105-125 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 105-125, July.
    6. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg & Iryna Topolyan, 2014. "The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 603-640, November.
    7. Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2016. "Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 219-234.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Group contests; incomplete information; global games.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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