Product Quality in a Simple OLG Model of Scientific Competition
Using a simple OLG model where the research output of one generation provides inputs for the next, the paper explains how quality standards can become established in scientific competition. Researchers seek status, which they get if their results are used by the next generation. Quality is hereditary in the sense that input quality affects output quality. Hereditary quality allows for simple coordination on quality standards.
|Date of creation:||2008|
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"The fallacy of the Good Samaritan: Volunteering as a weird way of making money,"
Economics working papers
2004-15, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Franz Hackl & Martin Halla & Gerald J. Pruckner, 2007. "Volunteering and Income - The Fallacy of the Good Samaritan?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 77-104, 02.
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Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1199-1235, September.
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