Entry, Exit, and Imperfect Competition in the Long Run
An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. Simple examples provide insights into: (1) the relationship between sunk costs and industry concentration, (2) entry when current profits are negative, and (3) the relationship between entry and the length of the product cycle. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibriumhas a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (0)161 275 4868
Fax: (0)161 275 4812
Web page: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/subjects/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:att:wimass:8904 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 649-70, May.
- Dewey, Donald, 1976. "Industrial Concentration and the Rate of Profit: Some Neglected Theory," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 67-78, April.
- B. Douglas Bernheim, 1984. "Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, Spring.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
- AMIRÂ , Rabah, 1995.
"Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transition,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1995009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 111-131, August.
- Rabah Amir & Val E. Lambson, 1998.
"On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets,"
CIE Discussion Papers
1998-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Rabah Amir, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1475, Econometric Society.
- AMIR, Rabah & LAMBSON, Val, 1999. "On the effects of entry in Cournot markets," CORE Discussion Papers 1999059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-83, May.
- Ericson, Richard & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 53-82, January.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
- Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
- Klepper, Steven, 1996. "Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 562-83, June.
- Lambson, Val Eugene, 1992. "Competitive Profits in the Long Run," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 125-42, January.
- Rob, Rafael, 1991. "Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 655-75, July.
- La Manna, Manfredi M. A., 1986. "Why are profits correlated with concentration?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 81-85.
- Hopenhayn, Hugo A, 1992. "Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1127-50, September.
- David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
- Dixit, A., 1988.
"Entry And Exit Decisions Under Uncertainty,"
91, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
- Lambson, Val Eugene, 1987. "Is the Concentration-Profit Correlation Partly an Artifact of Lumpy Technology?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 731-33, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:man:sespap:0315. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marianne Sensier)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.