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Entitlement in a Real Effort Ultimatum Game

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  • Michael D. Carr
  • Phil Mellizo

Abstract

Data from lab experiments support the claim that individuals have social preferences. Most models of social preferences, however, consider only the distribution of outcomes, not the source of the endowment used in the game. Once the source is considered, outcomes in the ultimatum game are more difficult to interpret. We extend the ultimatum game to allow for responder-produced endowments. We find that offers increase when the responder produces the endowment, but rejection rates are lower. Further, offers remain below 100% of the endowment, suggesting that unproductive proposers feel entitled to a part of the endowment, and responders respect this right.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael D. Carr & Phil Mellizo, 2013. "Entitlement in a Real Effort Ultimatum Game," Working Papers 2013_01, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:mab:wpaper:2013_01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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