Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns
This paper builds a theory of electoral campaign contributions. Interest groups contribute to political campaigns to signal their private information on the valence of candidates for office. Campaign contributions by an interest group enhance electoral fortunes by a candidate who is valent with this group. The candidate preferred by an interest group whose private information is the most precise receives the highest contributions and wins political office. Campaign contributions are smaller than donor electoral sorting benefits.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP 8888, succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3P8|
Phone: (514) 987-8161
Web page: http://www.cirpee.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Riccardo Puglisi & Andrea Prat & James Snyder, 2006.
"Is private campaign finance a good thing? estimates of the potential informational benefits,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/10393, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Prat, Andrea & Puglisi, Riccardo & Snyder, James M., 2010. "Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(3), pages 291-318, December.
- Andrea Prat & Riccardo Puglisi & James Snyder, 2005. "Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000960, David K. Levine.
- Prat, A., 1998.
"Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies,"
1998-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March.
- Prat, A., 1997.
"Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare,"
1997-118, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steven D. Levitt, 1995. "Policy Watch: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 183-193, Winter.
- Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
- Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April.
- Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, 03.
- Marco Battaglini & Roland Bénabou, 2003. "Trust, Coordination, and the Industrial Organization of Political Activism," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 851-889, 06.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R. & van Winden, F.A.A.M., 1997.
"Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements. The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behaviour,"
Other publications TiSEM
347b9f99-149a-4ab3-966f-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R. & van Winden, F.A.A.M., 1997. "Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements : The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior," Discussion Paper 1997-27, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Christian Schultz, 2003.
"Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
03-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
- Andrea Prat, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of Campaign Finance," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 1(2), pages 13-27, April.
- Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1976. "The Effect of Broadcasting on Political Campaign Spending: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 1095-1107, October.
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0722. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manuel Paradis)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.