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Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits

Author

Listed:
  • Prat, Andrea
  • Puglisi, Riccardo
  • Snyder, James M.

Abstract

What would happen if the current U.S. campaign finance system, mostly based on private donations, were replaced by a public funding scheme of the same magnitude? Some argue that public funding would deprive voters of useful information, but this can only be true if private donations are somehow targeted to "better" candidates. In this paper, we ask what voters can learn about the "effectiveness" of a legislator from the amount and pattern of contributions received during the campaign. We find that the total amount that a candidate receives is a positive, but weak, predictor of that candidate's effectiveness. Small contributions provide a strong and positive signal of effectiveness, while large contributions are a negative signal of effectiveness. Contributions from organizations also provide a positive signal, while contributions from individuals, parties, and candidates themselves do not.

Suggested Citation

  • Prat, Andrea & Puglisi, Riccardo & Snyder, James M., 2010. "Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(3), pages 291-318, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00008081
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00008081
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    Cited by:

    1. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    2. Cagé, Julia & Bekkouche, Yasmine, 2018. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," CEPR Discussion Papers 12614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Working Papers Series 68, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    4. Amit Gandhi & Daniela Iorio & Carly Urban, 2016. "Negative Advertising and Political Competition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 433-477.
    5. Elena Panova, 2007. "Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns," Cahiers de recherche 0722, CIRPEE.
    6. Petrova, Maria & Yildirim, Pinar & Sen, Ananya, 2017. "Social Media and Political Donations: New Technology and Incumbency Advantage in the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 11808, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Tilman Klumpp & Hugo Mialon & Michael Williams, 2012. "Matching Funds in Public Campaign Finance," Working Papers 2012-20, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    8. Fergusson, Leopoldo, 2014. "Media markets, special interests, and voters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 13-26.
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Brendan Daley & Erik Snowberg, 2007. "A MultiDimensional Signaling Model of Campaign Finance," Discussion Papers 06-027, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    11. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7rcgbs4v788terphdvb6a5e8t8 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10lirmbd5p8h4ae52oi51b4cka is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Vanberg, Christoph, 2008. ""One Man, One Dollar"? Campaign contribution limits, equal influence, and political communication," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 514-531, April.
    14. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Working Papers Series 68, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    15. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    16. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Dark Money and Politician Learning," SocArXiv 3bzex, Center for Open Science.
    17. Schnakenberg, Keith & Schumock, Collin & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Dark Money and Voter Learning," SocArXiv r562d, Center for Open Science.
    18. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS

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