An Economic Analysis of Campaign Finance
Electoral campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic model of campaign finance, which could be used for policy evaluation. At the core of the model lies an asymmetry of information between lobbies and voters. Lobbies know more than voters about the quality of candidates. Campaign contributions constitute an indirect way to reveal lobbiesâ€™ information to voters. However, this informational benefit comes at the cost of candidates deviating from the median voterâ€™s preferred policy in order to attract higher contributions.
Volume (Year): 1 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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