Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
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Cited by:
- Gartner, Daniel & Kolisch, Rainer, 2021. "Mathematical programming for nominating exchange students for international universities: The impact of stakeholders’ objectives and fairness constraints on allocations," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
many-to-many matching problem; course allocation; additive / lexicographic preferences; polynomial-time algorithm; NP-hardness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2016-04-04 (Game Theory)
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