Matching with quorums
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.007
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Matching with Quorums," Economics Working Papers 2012-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 265-280, October.
- ,, 2003. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 691-705, August.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
- ,, 2003. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 225-228, February.
- Manea, Mihai, 2007. "Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 316-330, November.
- Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
- ,, 2003. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(5), pages 879-883, October.
- John Hatfield, 2009. "Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 505-515, September.
- ,, 2003. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 411-413, April.
- Szilvia Pápai, 2001. "Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(3), pages 257-271, July.
- ,, 2003. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(6), pages 1195-1198, December.
- Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Klijn Flip, 2019.
"Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-9, January.
- Flip Klijn, 2017. "Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogenous Workers with Preferences over Peers," Working Papers 960, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Madhav Raghavan, 2017. "Serial Priority in Project Allocation: A Characterisation," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Ashwin Arulselvan & Agnes Cseh & Martin Groß & David F. Manlove & Jannik Matuschke, 2017. "Matchings with lower quotas: Algorithms and complexity," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1724, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Katarina Cechlarova & Bettina Klaus & David F.Manlove, 2018. "Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- William Thomson, 2018. "On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 67-99, June.
- Andreas Darmann & Janosch Döcker & Britta Dorn & Sebastian Schneckenburger, 2022. "Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 169-212, March.
- Goto, Masahiro & Iwasaki, Atsushi & Kawasaki, Yujiro & Yasuda, Yosuke & Yokoo, Makoto, 2014. "Improving Fairness and Efficiency in Matching with Distributional Constraints: An Alternative Solution for the Japanese Medical Residency Match," MPRA Paper 53409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cechlárová, Katarína & Fleiner, Tamás, 2017. "Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 3-10.
- Marek Bojko, 2020. "The Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms with Minimum Quotas," Papers 2012.11028, arXiv.org.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015.
"Centralized allocation in multiple markets,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
- Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets," Economics Working Papers 2012-09, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Textos para discussão 322, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
- Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia, 2022.
"Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 428-453.
- Péter Biró & Flip Klijn & Szilvia Pápai, 2021. "Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market," Working Papers 1255, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Nguyen, Thành & Peivandi, Ahmad & Vohra, Rakesh, 2016. "Assignment problems with complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 209-241.
- Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
- Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2020.
"Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 665-684, October.
- Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2017. "Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2019. "Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Jörgen Kratz, 2017. "Overlapping multiple object assignments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 723-753, March.
- Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 153-185, July.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2001. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence," Game Theory and Information 0112002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2004.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"Pairwise kidney exchange,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sönmez, Tayfun & Utku Ünver, M. & Roth, Alvin E., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Scholarly Articles 32072400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0408001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Feb 2005.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 620, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Nhan-Tam Nguyen & Dorothea Baumeister & Jörg Rothe, 2018. "Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 101-122, January.
- Papai, Szilvia, 2007. "Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 208-235, January.
- Honda, Edward, 2021. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
- Kojima, Fuhito, 2009. "Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 134-142, January.
- Jacob Coreno & Ivan Balbuzanov, 2022. "Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules," Papers 2204.08300, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
- Miralles, Antonio, 2012. "Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 179-206.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation," Working Papers 33, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2022.
"Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems,"
International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 61-76, March.
- Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2021. "Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.10, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2021.
"Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 105-118, March.
- Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Antonio Romero‐Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2020. "Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 349-354, September.
- Hoda Atef Yekta & Robert Day, 2020. "Optimization-based Mechanisms for the Course Allocation Problem," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 641-660, July.
- Madhav Raghavan, 2017. "Serial Priority in Project Allocation: A Characterisation," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
More about this item
Keywords
Matching; Efficiency; Serial dictatorship;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:1:p:14-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.