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Mice Do Not Take Bribes

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Barnebeck Andersen

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • John Rand

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

This paper explores the empirical association between internet use, e-government and corruption in a large panel of countries covering the 1998-2003 period. We show that higher numbers of internet users and higher levels of e-government are associated with significantly lower levels of corruption. Controlling for most variables used in previous work on corruption and addressing the endogeneity issue, results are shown to be robust and to carry economic significance. This leads us to conclude that well-designed ICT policies are likely to bring substantial benefits in the fight against corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & John Rand, 2005. "Mice Do Not Take Bribes," Discussion Papers 05-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0510
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2005/0510.pdf/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
    2. Ernest J. Wilson III, 2004. "The Information Revolution and Developing Countries," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262232308, December.
    3. Stromberg, David, 2001. "Mass media and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 652-663, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Iyad Dhaoui, 2022. "E-Government for Sustainable Development: Evidence from MENA Countries," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 13(3), pages 2070-2099, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries

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