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Judicial Independence in Kosovo. A Critical Analysis of Select Provisions of the Law on Courts

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  • Haxhi Xhemajli
  • Xhevdet Halili
  • Tristin M. Kilgallon

Abstract

As the Republic of Kosovo continues to develop as independent state, the world watches closely. Of particular interest to many is whether Kosovo will truly embrace the rule of law or whether it�s growth will continue to be hampered by the long shadow of corruption. As the judiciary plays a central role in ensuring the rule of law is implemented and followed, it is critical that judges are free to exercise their judicial power freely and without fear of recourse from other members of the government, or the public. To this end, the newly revised Law on Courts is a key piece of legislation, as it specifies the qualifications, rights, and duties of the judges. This paper will analyze key provisions of the Law on Courts, paying special attention to how they impact judicial independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Haxhi Xhemajli & Xhevdet Halili & Tristin M. Kilgallon, 2020. "Judicial Independence in Kosovo. A Critical Analysis of Select Provisions of the Law on Courts," Academicus International Scientific Journal, Entrepreneurship Training Center Albania, issue 22, pages 127-140, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:etc:journl:y:2020:i:22:p:127-140
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    References listed on IDEAS

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