Hostages, Free Lunches and Institutional Gaps: The Case of the European Currency Union
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Other versions of this item:
- Günter Franke, 2012. "Hostages, free lunches and institutional gaps: the case of the European Currency Union," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 26(1), pages 61-85, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsEuropean Currency Union; European Insolvency Charter; hostages; free lunch; externalization hypothesis;
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2011-12-19 (European Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2011-12-19 (Macroeconomics)
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