Hostages, Free Lunches and Institutional Gaps: The Case of the European Currency Union
This paper argues that the strong member states of the European Currency Union are hostages of a financially distressed member state so that they are compelled to provide financial support. Moreover, due to the dynamics of the interaction game, a debt relief is a free lunch for the distressed country. This fosters moral hazard of distressed countries. In the absence of capital market control, European politics do not effectively monitor fiscal politics of member states. The lack of a long term strategy of the European Currency Union to deal with distressed states has undermined the credibility of politics. This lack is also explained by a lack of a European Insolvency Charter. A viable Union requires such a charter with rules for handling distress. Moreover, politics should determine a mechanism to coordinate politics and capital markets in their monitoring of fiscal and economic policy of member states.
|Date of creation:||20 Nov 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: D-78457 Konstanz|
Web page: https://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/en
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/en|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011.
"From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1676-1706, August.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2010. "From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis," NBER Working Papers 15795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2003. "Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 276-304, 04.
- Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus, 2003. "Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3729, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1989. "Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior," Post-Print hal-00753237, HAL.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Kai Carstensen, 2010. "Ein Krisenmechanismus für die Eurozone," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63, pages 01-17, November.
- Franke, Gunter, 1991. "Exchange rate volatility and international trading strategy," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 292-307, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:knz:dpteco:1147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Office Ursprung)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.