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Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Kenju Kamei

    (Faculty of Economics, Keio University)

  • Katy Tabero

    (Department of Economics, University of Southampton)

Abstract

It is well-known that efficiency often fails to improve in public goods games with peer-to-peer punishment when counter-punishment is possible. This paper experimentally demonstrates, for the first time, that the effects of sanctioning institutions are modest, regardless of the decision-making format (individual or team). In the “team†conditions, subjects are randomly assigned to teams of three, and make joint decisions through communication. Their dialogue provides valuable insights into the motivations behind (counter-)punishment, as well as the resulting behavioral effects. A coding exercise reveals that first-order punishments (and counter-punishments) are primarily emotional responses to peers’ low contributions (and first order punishments, respectively).

Suggested Citation

  • Kenju Kamei & Katy Tabero, 2025. "Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series DP2025-019, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    • Handle: RePEc:keo:dpaper:dp2025-019
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • H49 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Other

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