Price discrimination via the choice of distribution channels
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References listed on IDEAS
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- repec:eee:ijrema:v:27:y:2010:i:2:p:142-150 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vincze, János, 2010.
"Miért és mitől védjük a fogyasztókat?. Aszimmetrikus információ és/vagy korlátozott racionalitás
[Asymmetric information and/or bounded rationality: why are consumers protected and from what?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 725-752.
More about this item
KeywordsPrice Discrimination; Distribution Channels; Credence Goods; Experts; Discounters;
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-01-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2006-01-01 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2006-01-01 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2006-01-01 (Marketing)
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