Quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly
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- GABSZEWICZ, Jean & WAUTHY, Xavier, 2002. "Quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1573, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
References listed on IDEAS
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- Sallstrom, Susanna, 1999. "Technological Progress and the Chamberlain Effect," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 427-449, December.
- Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
- Acharyya, Rajat, 1998. "Monopoly and product quality: Separating or pooling menu?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 187-194, November.
- Kim, Joo-Han & Kim, Jae-Cheol, 1996. "Quality choice of multiproduct monopolist and spill-over effect," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 345-352, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Acharyya, Rajat, 2005. "Quality discrimination among income constrained consumers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 245-251, February.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Alexander Konovalov, 2014.
"Too much or too little? Price-discrimination in a market for credence goods,"
2014-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Konovalov, Alexander, 2014. "Too Much or Too Little? Price-Discrimination in a Market for Credence Goods," Working Papers in Economics 582, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2014.
- Bacchiega, Emanuele & Bonroy, Olivier & Mabrouk, Rania, 2013.
"Paying not to sell,"
Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 137-140.
- Emanuele Bacchiega & Olivier Bonroy & Rania Mabrouk, 2013. "Paying not to sell," Post-Print hal-01064094, HAL.
- Bacchiega, E. & Bonroy, O. & Mabrouk, R., 2013. "Paying not to sell," Working Papers 2013-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- E. Bacchiega & O. Bonroy & R. Mabrouk, 2013. "Paying not to sell," Working Papers wp870, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- O. Tarola & C. Vergari, 2012. "A note on acquisition of complements in a vertically differentiated market," Working Papers wp832, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- repec:bpj:bejtec:v:19:y:2019:i:1:p:22:n:3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, 2012. "Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(1), pages 151-187.
- Gabszewicz, J.J. & Marini, M. & Tarola, O., 2015.
"Alliance Formation in a Vertically Differentiated Market,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2015030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean J. Gabszewicz & Marco A. Marini & Ornella Tarola, 2015. "Alliance Formation in a Vertically Differentiated Market," DIAG Technical Reports 2015-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
- Acharyya, Rajat & Banerjee, Swapnendu, 2012. "On tariff and quality innovation in a market with discrete preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 917-925.
- Gabszewicz Jean J. & Marini Marco A. & Tarola Ornella, 2019.
"Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-22, January.
- Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean & Marini, Marco A. & Tarola, Ornella, 2017. "Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products," MPRA Paper 80528, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ornella Tarola & Cecilia Vergari, 2015. "Asymmetric Complements in a Vertically Differentiated Market: Competition or Integration?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(1), pages 72-100, January.
- Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Marini, Marco A. & Tarola, Ornella, 2015. "Endogenous Mergers in Vertically Differentiated Markets," MPRA Paper 68318, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005. "Price discrimination via the choice of distribution channels," Economics working papers 2005-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Gerhard Orosel & Klaus G. Zauner, 2004. "Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality is Unobservable to Buyers," CESifo Working Paper Series 1271, CESifo Group Munich.
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