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Political Support and Candidate Choice

  • Hannes Mueller

    ()

    (STICERD, London School of Economics)

This paper proposes a simple model of political supporters in an environment of spatial political competition. We assume that supporters are driven by sympathy for a candidate with similar preferences on their side of the policy space and by fear of a candidate with different preferences on the other side. If parties maximize support in their candidate selection, political platforms can diverge significantly. We show that radical candidates have a positive effect on support for the other party. If candidate choice internalizes this externality, platforms converge and overall support decreases to a minimum.

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File URL: http://jeps.repec.org/papers/07-002.pdf
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Paper provided by JEPS in its series JEPS Working Papers with number 07-002.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:07002
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://jeps.repec.org/

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  1. John E. Roemer, 2004. "Modeling Party Competition in General Elections," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1488, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2003. "Competition and incentives with motivated agents," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2202, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
  4. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
  5. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March.
  6. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Barry Nalebuff & Roni Shachar, 1997. "Follow The Leader: Theory And Evidence On Political Participation," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm57, Yale School of Management.
  8. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  9. Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2044, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
  11. James Coleman, 1971. "Internal processes governing party positions in elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 35-60, September.
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