Cost Arrangement and Welfare in a Multi-Product Cournot Oligopoly
Welfare in a two-product Cournot oligopoly is shown to increase (decrease) with an increase in correlation between unit costs when the outputs complement (substitute) in demand. A more qualified correlation structure is required for the result to apply in a three-product Cournot oligopoly when products complement in demand.
|Date of creation:||23 Oct 2004|
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