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Estimation of an Efficient Tomato Contract

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Abstract

This paper estimates an agency model of contracts used in California's processing-tomato industry. Model estimation proceeds in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation schedule. Finally, we compare computed compensations with actual compensations and choose preference parameters to minimize distance between the two. Assuming perfect competition and risk neutrality for processors, we obtain an estimate of 0.08 for growers' measure of constant absolute risk aversion, and find that growers who face higher powered incentives produce higher levels of soluble solids, at a cost which is 1.8% greater than it would be otherwise. Efficiency losses from information constraints are estimated at 0.59% of mean compensation, while existing quality measurement improves efficiency by 1.08\.

Suggested Citation

  • Ligon, Ethan, 2002. "Estimation of an Efficient Tomato Contract," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10235, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:10235
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    Cited by:

    1. Yu, Xiaohua & Abler, David G. & Peng, Chao, 2008. "Dancing with the Dragon Heads: Enforcement, Innovations and Efficiency of Contracts between Agricultural Processors and Farmers in China," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6144, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan & Melkonyan, Tigran A., 2008. "Interactions between Explicit and Implicit Contracting: Evidence from California Agriculture," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6068, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Mussell, Al, 2003. "PRICE DISCOVERY MECHANISMS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR CANADIAN AGRICULTURE; Part II: A Review of Pricing Mechanisms from the Economic Literature," Miscellaneous Publications 18100, George Morris Center.
    4. Du, Xiaoxue & Lu, Liang & Zilberman, David, 2013. "The Economics of Contract Farming: A Credit and Investment Perspective," 2014 Allied Social Science Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 3-5, 2014, Philadelphia, PA 161657, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Du, Xiaoxue & Lu, Liang & Reardon, Thomas & Zilberman, David, 2015. "The Economics of Agricultural Supply Chain Design: A Portfolio Selection Approach," 2016 Allied Social Science Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 3-5, 2016, San Francisco, California 212809, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    6. Liang, Jing & Jensen, Helen H., 2008. "Marketing Agreement, Food Safety and Contract Design," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6434, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Just, David R. & Wu, Steve, 2005. "Loss Aversion and Reference Points in Contracts," Working Papers 127073, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    8. Rachael E. Goodhue & Dale M. Heien & Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. Sumner, 2003. "Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(3_4), pages 267-282, December.
    9. Vassalos, Michael & Hu, Wuyang & Woods, Timothy A. & Schieffer, Jack & Dillon, Carl R., 2013. "Fresh Vegetable Growers' Risk Perception, Risk Preference and Choice of Marketing Contracts: A Choice Experiment," 2013 Annual Meeting, February 2-5, 2013, Orlando, Florida 142506, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    10. Ahn, Kyeong Ah & Choi, Young Chan, 2016. "Role of farmer’s attitude to risk in the relationship between trust and contract decisions: The fresh apple market in South Korea," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 235762, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Jano, Pilar & Hueth, Brent, 2013. "Quality Incentives in Informal Markets: The Case of Ecuadorian Cocoa," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150378, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    12. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2003. "On the Efficacy of Contractual Provisions for Processing Tomatoes," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21990, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    13. Olmos, Marta Fernandez & Rosell-Martinez, Jorge & Espitia-Escuer, Manuel Antonio, 2008. "On the co-existence of spot and contract markets: an analysis of quality," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6082, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    14. repec:ags:aaea13:150001 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Olmos, Marta Fernandez & Rosell-Martinez, Jorge & Espitia-Escuer, Manuel Antonio, 2008. "The yield/quality trade-off and contractual choice," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6065, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

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