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Sacrifice and Sorting in Clubs

Author

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  • Jean-Paul Carvalho

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

In club models of religion, sacrifices demanded by religious groups promote efficient production of club goods by screening out free riders. An alternative, complementary view is that religious clubs provide a means of sorting, matching individuals with similar characteristics. Sorting differs from screening in that it operates on traits that do not directly affect club goods production. This paper explores the role of sacrifice in sorting among religious clubs when individuals prefer to interact with their own type. Despite this own-type bias, the usual free- rider problem in club goods production can inhibit sorting among groups. Pro- hibitions and demands for stigmatizing behavior can solve this problem. Costly sacrifices are demanded, not by groups catering to the majority, but by those attracting rare/exotic types. The rarer the type, the more costly the sacrifice required to a chieve sorting.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2015. "Sacrifice and Sorting in Clubs," Working Papers 151604, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:151604
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    File URL: https://www.economics.uci.edu/research/wp/1516/15-16-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2016. "Identity-Based Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 410-414, May.
    2. Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2017. "Coordination and culture," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 449-475, October.
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    6. Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2000. ""Beyond the Melting Pot": Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 955-988.
    7. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
    8. Scott E. Page, 2007. "Prologue to The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies, Princeton University Press.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Clark, 2020. ""You're Just My Type!" Matching and Payoffs When Like Attracts Like," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 295, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    2. Ennio E. Piano, 2018. "Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 350-376, August.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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