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“Entry Regulation Asymmetries and Gasoline Competition in a Mixed Motorway Network”

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Albalate

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona)

  • Jordi Perdiguero

    (Departament d'Economia Aplicada. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

Regulatory and funding asymmetries in the Spanish motorway network produce huge differences in the structure of gasoline markets by motorway type: free or toll. While competition is encouraged among gas stations on free motorways, the regulations for toll motorways allow private concessionaires to auction all gas stations to the same provider, thereby limiting competition and consolidating market power. This paper reports how this regulatory asymmetry results in higher prices and fewer gas stations. Specifically, we show that competition is constrained on toll motorways by the granting of geographical monopolies, resulting in a small number of rivals operating in close proximity to each other, and allowing gas stations to operate as local monopolies. The lack of competition would seem to account for the price differential between toll and free motorways. According to available evidence, deregulation measures affecting toll motorway concessions could help to mitigate price inefficiencies and increase consumer welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Albalate & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "“Entry Regulation Asymmetries and Gasoline Competition in a Mixed Motorway Network”," IREA Working Papers 201218, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Nov 2012.
  • Handle: RePEc:ira:wpaper:201218
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    File URL: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2012/201218.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Geographical competition; Regional Monopolies; Gasoline prices; Motorways JEL classification: L11; L12; L43;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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