Aid and the Delegated Fight against Terrorism
A positive empirical relationship is found between the level of foreign aid received by a country and the number of terrorist attacks originating from it. A simple model is used to explain it, where the donor delegates some actions against terrorism to the aid-recipient government. Aid is endogenous in an econometric equation explaining participation in terrorist events, as expected from the model, and an attacks-supply curve in which aid has a negative impact is presented at the end. Copyright � 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2005|
|Publication status:||Published in Review of Development Economics, vol.�10, n°2, avril 2006, p.�330-344.|
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