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Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying

Author

Listed:
  • Cesi Cruz
  • Philip Keefer
  • Julien Labonne

Abstract

Results from a new experiment shed light on the effects of voter information on vote buying and incumbent advantage. The treatment provided voters with information about a major spending program and the proposed allocations and promises of mayoral candidates just prior to municipal elections. It left voters more knowledgeable about candidates' proposed policies and increased the salience of spending, but did not affect vote shares and turnout. Treated voters were more likely to be targeted for vote buying. We develop a model of vote buying that accounts for these results. The information raised voter expectations regarding incumbent performance, especially in incumbent strongholds. Incumbents increased vote buying in response. Consistent with this explanation, both knowledge and vote buying impacts were higher in municipalities with dominant incumbents. Our findings show that, in a political environment where vote buying is the currency of electoral mobilization, incumbent efforts to increase voter welfare may take the form of greater vote buying.

Suggested Citation

  • Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne, 2016. "Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 7730, Inter-American Development Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:7730
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dragan Filipovich & Miguel Niño-Zarazúa & Alma Santillán Hernández, 2018. "Campaign externalities, programmatic spending, and voting preferences in rural Mexico: The case of Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera programme," WIDER Working Paper Series 027, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Municipal Elections; Public Services; Political Parties; Vote Buying; voter information; incumbent advantage;

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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