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The Politics of Public Goods Provision under Asymmetric Decentralization

Author

Listed:
  • Ignacio Lago
  • André Blais

Abstract

This paper examines how asymmetric regional decentralization affects the politics of public goods provision. Using survey data from Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Spain, as well as panel data from 709 legislative elections in 73 democracies between 1960 and 2018, the study analyzes how centralized, symmetric, and asymmetric territorial arrangements influence electoral accountability and party nationalization. The authors find that asymmetric decentralization decreases electoral accountability in national elections but increases it in regional elections, and that it contributes to greater territorial heterogeneity in partisan support.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Lago & André Blais, 2026. "The Politics of Public Goods Provision under Asymmetric Decentralization," IDEAGOV Working Papers WP2601, IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance.
    • Handle: RePEc:ida:wpaper:wp2601
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    File URL: https://repec.ideagov.eu/RePEc/ida/wpaper/WP2601.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chhibber, Pradeep & Kollman, Ken, 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 329-342, June.
    2. Philippe Chassé & Olivier Jacques & Colin Scott, 2025. "Between Decentralization and Asymmetry: Explaining Preferences toward the Division of Power in Canada," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 55(1), pages 147-173.
    3. Cameron D. Anderson, 2006. "Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual‐Level Analysis," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 449-463, April.
    4. Ignacio Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2016. "An economic explanation of the nationalization of electoral politics," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1602, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    5. David Lublin, 2025. "Extreme events, decentralisation and the effective number of parties," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(1), pages 2311739-231, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Santiago Lago-Penas & Maria Cadaval-Sampedro & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Ana Herrero-Alcalde, 2026. "Asymmetric Decentralization: Nature and Determinants," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2606, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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