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Decentralization and electoral swings

Author

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  • Ignacio Lago
  • André Blais

Abstract

We explore how the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within countries is affected by the level of economic and political decentralization. We rely on district-level data from OECD countries in two consecutive elections before and after the Great Recession to show that as regional governments exert more influence over the central government, districts deviate less from the overall pattern of change in support of the national incumbent party. The causal mechanism accounting for the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is examined with individual panel data from national elections in Canada and Spain.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Lago & André Blais, 2018. "Decentralization and electoral swings," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1805, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
  • Handle: RePEc:gov:wpaper:1805
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    File URL: http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es/WP/WP1805.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
    2. Emilie Caldeira, 2012. "Does the System of Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers in Senegal Eliminate Politically Motivated Targeting?," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 21(2), pages 167-191, March.
    3. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2011. "Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross Section of Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1872-1911, August.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:02:p:329-342_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1997. "The grievance asymmetry revisited: A micro study of economic voting in Denmark,1986-1992," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 81-99, February.
    7. Emilie Caldeira, 2012. "Does the System of Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers in Senegal Eliminate Politically Motivated Targeting?," Post-Print halshs-00681986, HAL.
    8. Brancati, Dawn, 2008. "The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 135-159, January.
    9. Israel Marques II & Eugenia Nazrullaeva & Andrei Yakovlev, 2016. "Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 23-54, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentralization; dynamic nationalization; electoral swing; Great Recession.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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