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Decentralization and electoral swings

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  • Ignacio Lago
  • André Blais

Abstract

This paper explores how the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within countries is affected by the level of economic and political decentralization. It relies on aggregate data from 3796 districts in 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in two consecutive national elections before and after the Great Recession to show that the more influential regional policies are for individuals’ well-being, the more uniform are electoral swings across districts. This causal mechanism accounting for the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is examined with Internet panel surveys from national elections in Canada and Spain.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Lago & André Blais, 2020. "Decentralization and electoral swings," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(7), pages 907-918, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:54:y:2020:i:7:p:907-918
    DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2019.1577960
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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