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Asymmetric Decentralization: Nature and Determinants

Author

Listed:
  • Santiago Lago-Peñas
  • María Cadaval-Sampedro
  • Jorge Martínez-Vázquez
  • Ana Herrero-Alcalde

Abstract

This paper provides a systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of asymmetric decentralization across a broad cross-section of countries and regions. Using data from the Regional Authority Index (RAI), the authors examine both cross-country and cross-regional variation and assess the extent to which structural factors—such as ethnic fragmentation, population size, territorial diversity, and geographic characteristics—shape asymmetric outcomes. The study finds that geographic, demographic and social variables explain asymmetry more consistently than economic or political factors. At the regional level, distance from the national capital and linguistic distinctiveness are associated with above-average authority. Dynamic analysis shows that transitions to democracy act as catalysts that activate underlying structural conditions, increasing asymmetry over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago Lago-Peñas & María Cadaval-Sampedro & Jorge Martínez-Vázquez & Ana Herrero-Alcalde, 2026. "Asymmetric Decentralization: Nature and Determinants," IDEAGOV Working Papers WP2605, IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance.
    • Handle: RePEc:ida:wpaper:wp2605
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez, 2019. "Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18495.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    3. Ignacio Lago & Andre Blais, 2026. "The Politics of Public Goods Provision Under Asymmetric Decentralization," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2602, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    4. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2007. "Asymmetric Federalism in Russia: Cure or Poison?," Chapters, in: Richard M. Bird & Robert D. Ebel (ed.), Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Luiz de Mello & Joao Tovar Jalles, 2026. "Parable of the Talents: Does Differentiated Decentralisation Improve Performance?," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2603, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Ignacio Lago & André Blais, 2026. "The Politics of Public Goods Provision under Asymmetric Decentralization," IDEAGOV Working Papers WP2601, IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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