Multiple-self models in neuroeconomics. A methodological critique
The idea of multiple-self models in economics is that individual identity is the equilibrium result of the strategic interaction between sub-personal selves. These models fill the gap of standard rational choice theory in explaining inter-temporal inconsistency of choices. This modelling procedure requires an extension of revealed preference theory to the sub-personal level. This extension is grounded in the assumption that sub-personal selves are economic agents to whom analytical tools of microeconomics apply. I claim that this assumption is false and entails the empirical methodology of functional localization that fails to provide robust results.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2012|
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