Factors Affecting the Power of Patent Rights
In this paper, we identify three policy instruments governments have at their disposal to affect the power of patent rights to prevent imitation: the size of the inventive step used to make the patent granting decision, the rigour of the patent examination process and the predisposition of the courts to affirm the patent office’s decision. We develop a simple framework to analyse the effects of changing these policy instruments on ex ante investment in invention in the light of recent concerns about the potential effects of socially undesirable patents.
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- Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001.
"Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?,"
Economics Working Papers
E01-303, University of California at Berkeley.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 51-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Law and Economics 0201001, EconWPA.
- Gallini, Nancy & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9wx2c2hz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000532, David K. Levine.
- Lemley, Mark A. & Shapiro, Carl, 2004.
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
qt9xf1488p, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Allison, John R. & Lemley, Mark & Moore, Kimberly A. & Trunkey, Derek, 2003. "Valuable Patents," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1m16k7w3, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Lemley, Mark, 2000. "Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1tc166q2, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
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