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On the efficiency properties of the Roy's model under asymmetric information

Author

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  • Mendolicchio, Concetta

    (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany])

  • Pietra, Tito

Abstract

"We consider Roy's economies with perfectly competitive labor markets and asymmetric information. Firms choose their investments in physical capital before observing the characteristics of the labor markets they will face. We provide conditions under which equilibrium allocations are constrained Pareto efficient, i.e., such that it is impossible to improve upon the equilibrium allocation by changing agents' investments and letting the other endogenous variables adjust to restore market clearing. We also provide a robust example of a class of economies where these conditions fail and where equilibria are characterized by overinvestments in high skills. Finally, we discuss some implications of our main results for the optimal taxation literature." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Mendolicchio, Concetta & Pietra, Tito, 2014. "On the efficiency properties of the Roy's model under asymmetric information," IAB Discussion Paper 201408, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabdpa:201408
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Per Krusell & Lee E. Ohanian & JosÈ-Victor RÌos-Rull & Giovanni L. Violante, 2000. "Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1029-1054, September.
    2. Saez, Emmanuel, 2004. "Direct or indirect tax instruments for redistribution: short-run versus long-run," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 503-518, March.
    3. Angrist, Joshua D, 1996. "Short-Run Demand for Palestinian Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 425-453, July.
    4. Mendolicchio Concetta & Paolini Dimitri & Pietra Tito, 2012. "Asymmetric Information And Overeducation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-29, October.
    5. Concetta Mendolicchio & Dimitri Paolini & Tito Pietra, 2014. "Income Taxes, Subsidies to Education, and Investments in Human Capital," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(1), pages 24-47, February.
    6. Mendolicchio, Concetta & Paolini, Dimitri & Pietra, Tito, 2012. "Investments in education and welfare in a two-sector, random matching economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 367-385.
    7. Naito, Hisahiro, 1999. "Re-examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non-linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 165-188, February.
    8. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-278, June.
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    10. Firouz Gahvari, 2014. "Second-Best Taxation of Incomes and Non-Labor Inputs in a Model with Endogenous Wages," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(6), pages 917-935, December.
    11. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    12. Daron Acemoglu, 1996. "A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 779-804.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arbeitsmarkttheorie; Investitionsverhalten; Marktgleichgewicht; Humankapital; Besteuerung - Optimierung; Pareto Vilfredo; Arbeitsmarktmodell; Informationsfluss; Volkswirtschaftstheorie; Arbeitsmarktgleichgewicht; Unternehmen; Gleichgewichtstheorie; Bildungsinvestitionen;

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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