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On the efficiency properties of the Roy's model under asymmetric information

Author

Listed:
  • Mendolicchio, Concetta

    (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; Institute for Employment Research)

  • Pietra, Tito

    (Universita di Bologna)

Abstract

"We consider Roy's economies with perfectly competitive labor markets and asymmetric information. Firms choose their investments in physical capital before observing the characteristics of the labor markets they will face. We provide conditions under which equilibrium allocations are constrained Pareto efficient, i.e., such that it is impossible to improve upon the equilibrium allocation by changing agents' investments and letting the other endogenous variables adjust to restore market clearing. We also provide a robust example of a class of economies where these conditions fail and where equilibria are characterized by overinvestments in high skills. Finally, we discuss some implications of our main results for the optimal taxation literature." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Mendolicchio, Concetta & Pietra, Tito, 2014. "On the efficiency properties of the Roy's model under asymmetric information," IAB-Discussion Paper 201408, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabdpa:201408
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saez, Emmanuel, 2004. "Direct or indirect tax instruments for redistribution: short-run versus long-run," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 503-518, March.
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    10. Mendolicchio Concetta & Paolini Dimitri & Pietra Tito, 2012. "Asymmetric Information And Overeducation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-29, October.
    11. Firouz Gahvari, 2014. "Second-Best Taxation of Incomes and Non-Labor Inputs in a Model with Endogenous Wages," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(6), pages 917-935, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Besteuerung ; Bildungsinvestitionen ; Gleichgewichtstheorie ; Humankapital ; Informationsfluss ; Investitionsverhalten ; Marktgleichgewicht ; Optimierung ; Pareto; Vilfredo ; Unternehmen ; Arbeitsmarktgleichgewicht ; Arbeitsmarktmodell ; Arbeitsmarkttheorie ; Volkswirtschaftstheorie;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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