Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulatorâ€™s objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulatorâ€™s reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of the aggregate demand function. 2) It yields a positive information rent effect exactly when demand is convex. 3) Firms benefit from regulatory risk exactly when demand is convex. 4) Consumersâ€™ risk preferences tend to contradict the firmâ€™s. 5) Benevolent regulators always prefer regulatory risk and these preferences may contradict both the firmâ€™s and consumersâ€™ preferences.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Spandauer Str. 1,10178 Berlin|
Web page: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Strausz, Roland, 2006.
"Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 306-314, May.
- Roland Strausz, "undated". "Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal--Agent Models," Papers 020, Departmental Working Papers.
- Miles S. Kimball, 1989.
"Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large,"
NBER Working Papers
2848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
- Thomas P. Lyon, 1991. "Regulation with 20-20 Hindsight: "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose"?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 581-595, Winter.
- Kolbe, A Lawrence & Tye, William B, 1996. "Compensation for the risk of stranded costs," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(12), pages 1025-1050, December.
- Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1990.
"Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean., 1988. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers 665, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Jean TIROLE, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9005, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985.
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms,"
368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Robert S. Pindyck, 1986.
"Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice, and the Value of the Firm,"
NBER Working Papers
1980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pindyck, Robert S, 1988. "Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice, and the Value of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 969-985, December.
- Pindyck, Robert S., 1986. "Irreversible investment, capacity choice, and the value of the firm," Working papers 1802-86., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Mayo, 2005. "Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 628-644, Autumn.
- Paolo M. Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2003. "Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series 934, CESifo Group Munich.
- Paul A. Samuelson, 1972. "The Consumer Does Benefit from Feasible Price Stability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(3), pages 476-493.
- David J. Salant & Glenn A. Woroch, 1992. "Trigger Price Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 29-51, Spring.
- Hayne E. Leland, 1968. "Saving and Uncertainty: The Precautionary Demand for Saving," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(3), pages 465-473.
- Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, 1994. "The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 538-554, Winter.
- Chang, Mo Ahn & Thompson, Howard E, 1989. "An Analysis of Some Aspects of Regulatory Risk and the Required Rate of Return for Public Utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 241-257, September.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
- Hartman, Richard, 1972. "The effects of price and cost uncertainty on investment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 258-266, October.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988.
"The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
- Abel, Andrew B, 1983. "Optimal Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 228-233, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2009-006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RDC-Team)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.