Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations
It has been shown (Hart ) that the backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is the unique stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large, under the assumption that the expected number of mutations per generation is bounded away from zero. Here it is shown that one can dispense with this last condition. In particular, it follows that the backward induction equilibrium is evolutionarily stable for large populations.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2003|
|Publication status:||Published in Mathematics of Operation Research, 2006, vol. 31, pp. 369-380.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
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- Hart, Sergiu, 2002.
"Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-264, November.
- Sergiu Hart, 1999. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction," Game Theory and Information 9905002, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000.
- Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
- Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, "undated". "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
- G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson, 2010. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 538, David K. Levine.
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