Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria
This work follows “Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction” (Hart ) in the study of dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. Under the assumption that there is a single backward induction (or subgame perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game, Hart  proved that this point is the only stable state. In this work, we examine the case where there are multiple backward induction equilibria.
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- Hart, Sergiu, 2002.
"Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-264, November.
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