Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly with Separable Information, or Nondifferentiable
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- Luo, Jianli, 2012. "Information acquisition under uncertainty: The case of labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms coexist," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2527-2532.
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KeywordsOligopoly; Incomplete Information; Information advantage; Bayesian Cournot; Equilibrium; Sunspots; Non-differentiability; Inverse demand;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-11-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2009-11-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2009-11-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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