The effectiveness of simple homogeneous commodity procurement under rigid govermental regulation: the case of granulated sugar procurement in Russia
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More about this item
Keywordspublic procurement; e-auctions; procurement effectiveness;
All these keywords.
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CIS-2014-03-01 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-COM-2014-03-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-REG-2014-03-01 (Regulation)
- NEP-TRA-2014-03-01 (Transition Economics)
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