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The effectiveness of simple homogeneous commodity procurement under rigid govermental regulation: the case of granulated sugar procurement in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Andrey Yakovlev

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Aleksandra Bashina

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Olga Demidova

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

In the 2000s the Russian government considered electronic auctions (e-auctions) as the best way to procure goods for public needs. In this paper we confirm this proposition using an empirical dataset of contracts for the procurement of granulated sugar in Russia in 2011. Our data shows that unit prices are higher in the case of long-term contracts. This result can be explained by the rigidity of public procurement regulations as Russian legislation allows only fixed price contracts. Under these conditions suppliers can participate in public procurement tenders for long-term contracts only if their price includes a “risk premium” covering additional expenses of the supplier in case of an unfavorable turn in the market. Our analysis shows that sugar prices in Russian public procurement are lower for contracts with higher volume. These results are in the line with conclusions of previous studies of public procurement in other countries. The influence of competition measured by the number of suppliers participating in the procurement procedure has a quadratic form. It means that the effect of a new participant is lower when number of competitors is higher and vice versa. Our analysis also shows that there are essential distinctions in the influence of the same factors on contract prices for competitive procedures and void auctions

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey Yakovlev & Aleksandra Bashina & Olga Demidova, 2014. "The effectiveness of simple homogeneous commodity procurement under rigid govermental regulation: the case of granulated sugar procurement in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 13/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:13/pa/2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Raventós, Pedro & Zolezzi, Sandro, 2015. "Electronic tendering of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Chile," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(12), pages 2569-2578.
    2. Fazekas,Mihály & Blum,Jurgen Rene, 2021. "Improving Public Procurement Outcomes : Review of Tools and the State of the Evidence Base," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9690, The World Bank.
    3. Tkachenko, Andrey & Yakovlev, Andrei & Kuznetsova, Aleksandra, 2017. "‘Sweet deals’: State-owned enterprises, corruption and repeated contracts in public procurement," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 52-67.

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    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance

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