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Moral, the Informal Sector, and Unemployment

Author

Listed:
  • Kolm, Ann-Sofie

    (Department of Economics)

  • Larsen, Birthe

    (Centre for Research in Social Integration and Marginalization)

Abstract

While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heterogeneous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how wage setting and unemployment is affected by punishment policies, which is ignored in the previous literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2001. "Moral, the Informal Sector, and Unemployment," Working Paper Series 2001:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2001_009
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2001. "Moral Costs, The Informal Sector And Unemployment," Working Papers 01-2001, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    2. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    3. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bosch, Mariano & Esteban-Pretel, Julen, 2012. "Job creation and job destruction in the presence of informal markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 270-286.
    2. Mariano Bosch, 2006. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Presence of Informal Labour Markets," CEP Discussion Papers dp0761, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Luigi Bonaventura, 2011. "Enforcement of regulation, irregular sector, and firm performance: a computational agent-based model," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 99-113, July.
    4. Bosch, Mariano & Maloney, William F., 2008. "Cyclical Movements in Unemployment and Informality in Developing Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 3514, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Maxim Bouev, 2005. "State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study in the Economics of the Informal Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp764, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    6. Kolm, A.S. & Larsen, B., 2001. "Wages, Unemployment, and the Underground Economy," Papers 2001:08, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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