IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/oslohe/2001_001.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Health Insurance: Treatment vs. Compensation

Author

Listed:
  • Asheim, Geir

    () (Department of Economics)

  • Nilssen, Tore

    () (Department of Economics)

  • Emblem, Anne Wenche

    () (Agder University)

Abstract

In this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in income. We discuss how an individual’s ability when healthy affects her decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment to full recovery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash compensation for the resulting loss in income. We find that a highability individual demands full recovery and is fully insured, while a low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation and is only partly insured.

Suggested Citation

  • Asheim, Geir & Nilssen, Tore & Emblem, Anne Wenche, 2009. "Health Insurance: Treatment vs. Compensation," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2001:1, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2001_001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2001/HERO2001_1.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Byrne, Margaret M. & Thompson, Peter, 2000. "Death and dignity: Terminal illness and the market for non-treatment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 263-294, May.
    2. Robert F. Graboyes, 2000. "Our money or your life : indemnities vs. deductibles in health insurance," Working Paper 00-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    3. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
    4. Haveman, Robert & Wolfe, Barbara, 2000. "The economics of disability and disability policy," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 995-1051 Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Koc, Cagatay, 2004. "A theoretical rationale for an inelastic demand for health care," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 9-14, January.
    2. Asheim, Geir B. & Emblem, Anne Wenche & Nilssen, Tore, 2003. "Deductibles in Health Insurances: Pay or Pain?," Memorandum 13/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    3. Anne Emblem, 2002. "Redistribution at the Hospital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 367-378, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health Insurance; Treatment; Compensation;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2001_001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anbjørg Kolaas). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/heuiono.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.