Distributional constraints and efficiency in a tradable permit market
It is a well known result that taking distributional constraints into account when allocating tradable permits to different agents can lead to an imperfectly competitive permit market. Hence, the emission target is no longer met at least cost. In this paper we suggest an allocation rule for permits which can handle this problem. If the permits are allocated twice during the same period, and the allocation in the second round is dependent on the market price for permits, this allocation rule can achieve both cost effectiveness and meet specific requirements for cost distribution across agents.
|Date of creation:||08 May 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway|
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- Lasse Ringius & Asbjørn Torvanger & Arild Underdal, 2002. "Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-22, March.
- Hagem, Cathrine & Westskog, Hege, 1998. "The Design of a Dynamic Tradeable Quota System under Market Imperfections," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 89-107, July.
- Christoph BOhringer & Andreas LOschel, 2003. "Market power and hot air in international emissions trading: the impacts of US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(6), pages 651-663.
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