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Genetic testing when there is a mix of public and private health insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Hoel,M.
  • Iversen,T.

    (University of Oslo, Department of Economics)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Hoel,M. & Iversen,T., 2000. "Genetic testing when there is a mix of public and private health insurance," Memorandum 31/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2000_031
    as

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    File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2000/Memo-31-2000.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hoy, Michael, 1989. "The value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-206, July.
    2. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    genetic testing;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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