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Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application

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Abstract

This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to, e.g., understand how to model preferences, and how to define relevant axioms and multidimensional constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Andersson, Tommy, 2017. "Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application," Working Papers 2017:16, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2017_016
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    File URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp17_16.pdf
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    1. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús & Rapoport, Hillel, 2014. "Tradable immigration quotas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 94-108.
    2. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS, 2016. "Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Stable Maximum Matchings," Cahiers de recherche 13-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    3. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 155-190, August.
    4. Philip Grech, 2017. "Undesired properties of the European Commission’s refugee distribution key," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 212-238, June.
    5. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars, 2016. "Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings," Working Papers 2016:18, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 27 Aug 2018.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202103100800001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Unver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing," NBER Working Papers 26951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms," NBER Working Papers 26767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202104130700001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    5. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1015, Boston College Department of Economics.
    6. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Alessandro MARTINELLO, 2018. "Dynamic Refugee Matching," Cahiers de recherche 22-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    7. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 977, Boston College Department of Economics.
    8. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2021. "How to De-Reserves Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India," Papers 2103.05899, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    9. Biró, Péter & Gudmundsson, Jens, 2021. "Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 291(2), pages 614-628.
    10. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Can Economic Theory be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1026, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 23 Jun 2021.
    11. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 978, Boston College Department of Economics.
    12. Xiang Han & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2021. "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1038, Boston College Department of Economics.
    13. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action," Papers 2004.13264, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    forced migration; asylum seekers; refugee assignment; matching; market design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration

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