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Overlapping Multiple Assignments

Author

Listed:
  • Kratz, Jörgen

    () (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences, group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance. It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained in the main result.

Suggested Citation

  • Kratz, Jörgen, 2014. "Overlapping Multiple Assignments," Working Papers 2014:44, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_044
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    File URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp14_44.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 265-280, October.
    2. James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2013. "Assignment of Arrival Slots," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 164-185, May.
    3. repec:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:29-55 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
    6. Tommy Andersson & Lars‐Gunnar Svensson, 2014. "Non‐Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 507-539, March.
    7. Bettina Klaus & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(3), pages 421-435.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multiple assignments; overlapping assignments; sequential dictatorship; strategyproofness; compatibility;

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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