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Assignment of Arrival Slots

Author

Listed:
  • James Schummer
  • Rakesh V. Vohra

Abstract

Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle variants of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Pápai (2000) for related but distinct models. Finally, both mechanisms may fail another condition: the incentive to vacate unusable landing slots. (JEL D45, D82, L93, L98, P14, R41)

Suggested Citation

  • James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2013. "Assignment of Arrival Slots," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 164-185, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:2:p:164-85
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.164
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 265-280, October.
    2. Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Kan Chang & Ken Howard & Rick Oiesen & Lara Shisler & Midori Tanino & Michael C. Wambsganss, 2001. "Enhancements to the FAA Ground-Delay Program Under Collaborative Decision Making," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 31(1), pages 57-76, February.
    4. Mehmet C. Demirci & Andrew J. Schaefer & H. Edwin Romeijn & Mark S. Roberts, 2012. "An Exact Method for Balancing Efficiency and Equity in the Liver Allocation Hierarchy," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 24(2), pages 260-275, May.
    5. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:29-55 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Romani de Oliveira, Ítalo, 2017. "Analyzing the performance of distributed conflict resolution among autonomous vehicles," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 92-112.
    3. Jörgen Kratz, 2017. "Overlapping multiple object assignments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 723-753, March.
    4. Triossi, Matteo & Romero Medina, Antonio, 2017. "Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note," UC3M Working papers. Economics 25310, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Balbuzanov, Ivan & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2017. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Working Paper Series rwp17-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    6. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2017. "A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 133-152, January.
    7. Kratz, Jörgen, 2014. "Overlapping Multiple Assignments," Working Papers 2014:44, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    8. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & Özgür Yilmaz, 2016. "How (Not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 900, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Oct 2017.
    9. Triossi, Matteo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
    • P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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