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Assignment of Arrival Slots

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  • James Schummer
  • Rakesh V. Vohra

Abstract

Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle variants of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Pápai (2000) for related but distinct models. Finally, both mechanisms may fail another condition: the incentive to vacate unusable landing slots. (JEL D45, D82, L93, L98, P14, R41)

Suggested Citation

  • James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2013. "Assignment of Arrival Slots," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 164-185, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:2:p:164-85
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.164
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Marie-Sklaerder Vié & Nicolas Zufferey & Roel Leus, 2022. "Aircraft landing planning under uncertain conditions," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 203-228, April.
    4. Schummer, James & Abizada, Azar, 2017. "Incentives in landing slot problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 29-55.
    5. Antonio Romero‐Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2020. "Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 349-354, September.
    6. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2018. "Centralized Course Allocation," UC3M Working papers. Economics 27388, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note," UC3M Working papers. Economics 25310, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    8. Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2022. "A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 38-49, March.
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    11. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action," Papers 2004.13264, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    12. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2017. "A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 133-152, January.
    13. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2021. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 105-118, March.
    14. Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
    15. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020. "Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 965-1005, May.
    16. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    17. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202103100800001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2021. "How to De-Reserves Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India," Papers 2103.05899, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    19. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms," NBER Working Papers 26767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.
    21. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
    22. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202104130700001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    23. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2018. "How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 193-231.
    24. Viet-Cuong Trieu & Fu-Ren Lin, 2022. "The Development of a Service System for Facilitating Food Resource Allocation and Service Exchange," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-29, September.
    25. Kratz, Jörgen, 2014. "Overlapping Multiple Assignments," Working Papers 2014:44, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
    • P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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