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Assignment of Arrival Slots

Author

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  • James Schummer
  • Rakesh V. Vohra

Abstract

Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle variants of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Pápai (2000) for related but distinct models. Finally, both mechanisms may fail another condition: the incentive to vacate unusable landing slots. (JEL D45, D82, L93, L98, P14, R41)

Suggested Citation

  • James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2013. "Assignment of Arrival Slots," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 164-185, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:2:p:164-85
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.164
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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