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On Flexibility in Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Ellingsen, Tore

    () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

The paper demonstrates that, even when firms' initial moves are simultaneous, the mere opportunity to wait out the opponent's move may be as harmful as a secondmover disadvantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Ellingsen, Tore, 1994. "On Flexibility in Oligopoly," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 21, Stockholm School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0021
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    2. Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 183-187, June.
    3. Pal, Debashis, 1991. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 441-448, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Fonseca & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2006. "Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 443-456, October.
    2. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2011. "Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 721-754, October.
    3. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2002. "To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 240-264, February.
    4. Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller, 2004. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information and Market Structure," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71(284), pages 575-587, November.
    5. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
    6. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2015. "Commitment in alternating offers bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 12-18.
    7. Muller, Wieland, 2006. "Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 100-111, May.
    8. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2008. "Making sense of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing in duopoly markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 657-666, December.
    9. Marcel Boyer & Armel Jacques & Michel Moreaux, 2002. "On the Relationship Between Financial Status and Investment in Technological Flexibility," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-14, CIRANO.
    10. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2010. "Cournot or Stackelberg competition? A survey on experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 24468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Marcel Boyer & Armel Jacques & Michel Moreaux, 2001. "Bankruptcy Cost, Financial Structure and Technological Flexibility Choices," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-27, CIRANO.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopoly; flexibility; Stackelberg; first mover advantage;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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